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FEDERAL JURY REFORMATION:
SAVING A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
by Carl H. Imlay*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years Americans have been so preoccupied with collateral
problems: in criminal cases that they have overlooked the central proc-
ess by which the ultimate verdict in the case is reached. In its zeal for
improving procedural due process in other areas, the American legal
system had truly all but forgotten that its jury selection system was de-
signed to produce unrepresentative jury venires.2 Though courts had
sought to assure that evidence would not be illegally obtained 3 and that
arrested persons would be speedily presented before a committing mag-
istrate,4 be represented by attorneys5 and have a record of the pro-
ceedings against them,6 they nevertheless allowed juries to be selected
through an unrepresentative process that infected the verdict itself.
7
Such a process was perpetuated by the various systems adopted by
federal courts for choosing prospective jurors. In one such system,
courts delegated the jury selection function to court clerks who in turn
relied upon prominent citizens in the community, called "key men," to
supply them with lists of prospective jurors.' This procedure, how-
ever, only selected jurors who were considered desirable by the "key
men." Some courts adopted procedures whereby telephone books or
tax rolls were used by the clerks as name sources.' Such sources
* A.B. Harvard; J.D. with honors, George Washington University Law School;
General Counsel, Administrative Office of the United States Courts. (Unattributed
viewpoints expressed herein are personal observations of the author, and do not
necessarily reflect any official position).
1. See, e.g., Kessler, The Crime Crisis and Proposed Procedural Reform, 5 Loy.
L.A.L Rav. 1 (1972).
2. See text accompanying notes 8-15 infra.
3. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914).
4. See Malloy v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
5. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
7. See text accompanying notes 8-15 infra.
8. ABA SEcriON OF JuDICmIL ADMINISTRATION, Thn IMPOVEMENT OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF Jus'ncE 62 (5th ed. 1971).
9. Id. at 64.
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tended to yield primarily the names of male heads of households of
that economic stratum affluent enough to afford telephone listings or
pay property taxes.' 0 Still other courts accepted volunteers for jury
service." The danger inherent in this practice was the possibility of
getting "professional jurors" and the opportunity for "packing" the
panel with jurors of certain views or allegiances.'" One system utilized
by courts conscientiously attempting to create a system of proportional
representation was to ask for names of blacks, workers and women
from which to compose jury lists.' 3  This also failed to produce a fair
sampling of public attitudes because the lists generally contained only
the names of persons associated with various organizations. These
systems were even encouraged by the 1942 Knox Report 4 submitted
to the Judicial Conference by its Committee on Selection of Jurors
which flatly suggested that "[c]ity and town officials, school au-
thorities, ministers, doctors, and leading business men would seem to
be the most likely sources for suitable lists" of jurors.15
Our legal system was strangely schizophrenic with respect to whether
we really wanted representative juries. Discrimination against blacks
10. Id. This method also allowed the clerk to make discreet exclusions as he saw
fit based on race and sex. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
11. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERFNCE OF THE COMM. ON SELECTION OF JURORS 25-26 (1942).
12. Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 432 (1960).
A survey of 90 districts made by the Institute of Judicial Administration in 1958
found that of 87 responding, 25 used volunteers regularly and 11 rarely. Id. Al-
though this study did not attempt to draw a correlation betweeen volunteers and retired
or economically self-sufficient persons, other studies have revealed a rather strong rela-
tionship. For example, Kalven and Zeisel found that volunteer jurors in Peoria, Illi-
nois included 29% housewives, 23% unemployed, and 16% retired persons. Hearings
on Proposals to Improve Judicial Machinery for the Selection of Federal Juries Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1967). Both Professor Zeisel and Pro-
fessor Edwin S. Mills reported separate studies showing disproportionate representation
of affluent classes. Id. at 128, 207-08, 211-12.
13. ABA SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, TIE IMPROVEMENT OF Tim AD-
MImmTION OF JuSTICE 62 (5th ed. 1971).
14. In 1941 the Judicial Conference of the United States authorized the appoint-
ment of a committee of five United States District Judges to investigate the need for
improvement in the methods of jury selection in United States courts. That commit-
tee made a comprehensive study of the problems of jury selection and presented its
final report, known as the KNOX REPORT, to the Judicial Conference in 1942. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
COMM. ON SELECTION OF JURORS (1942) [hereinafter cited as KNox REPORT).
15. KNOX REPORT, supra note 14, at 17.
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had been clearly proscribed by 1935 in Norris v. Alabama,1" and by
1940 the practice of "tokenism" in selecting blacks for jury service
was likewise proscribed. 17  However, the notion that the lists from
which prospective jurors were selected should be cross sectional or
representative of the community did not take hold. The Knox Report,
after noting that a jury must represent a cross section of the commu-
nity, offered the following caveat:
Nothing in the concepts offers any obstruction to efforts to obtain com-
petent jurors. Nothing in them opposes the tradition of federal courts
that jurors should be men of recognized intelligence and probity."'
The fact of the matter was that the cross sectional theory was only
theory so long as those individuals responsible for the selection of jurors
were allowed to make a subjective judgment as to who were such "men
of recognized intelligence and probity."1" The use of the word "men"
was perhaps more than a Freudian slip since women were then dis-
qualified in 21 states, and in 15 other states and the District of Colum-
bia they could claim excuse because they were women.20  State dis-
qualification automatically excluded women from federal juries because,
prior to 1957, competency to serve on federal juries was determined
by the law of the state in which the federal court was located."' The
practice of calling women in any significant numbers was by 1946
compelled by the Supreme Court in Ballard v. United States.22 Pro-
16. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
17. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940). The problem of excluding persons be-
cause of race remained however as a sorrowful commentary in state jury selection.
See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
18. KNox REPORT, supra note 14, at 14-15, quoting ABA SECTION OF JuDIcrAL
ADMINISTRATION, SELECTING FEDERAL COURT JURORS, AN INCIDENT OF THE JUDGE-JURY
RELATMONSHIP IN FEDERAL COURTS 9 (1942).
19. KNox REPORT, supra note 14, at 15. The use of "key men" (see text accom-
panying note 8 supra) in the selection of jurors was approved in a 1960 report to the
Judicial Conference of the United States by its Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System. Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 470
(1960). In that report a sample of a letter to "key men" requesting lists of prospec-
tive jurors was included as an exhibit. Id. at 513. The letter specifically asked the
"key men" to
bear in mind that a prospective juror should be esteemed in his community as a
person of good character, approved integrity, sound judgment and fair education.
Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
The report thus prevented the implementation of the cross sectional theory by approv-
ing the subjective method of choosing jurors.
20. KNox REPORT, supra note 14, at 23.
21. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1861(4), 62 Stat. 951. See text accompany-
ing note 31 infra.
22. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
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prietors, corporate officials and managers were represented far out of
proportion to their numbers in the community, while various semi-
skilled workers were grossly under represented.1 The "Main Street
town booster," a middle-aged male in the middle income bracket, re-
mained the prototype of our federal juror. A study of the key man
system by Professor Edwin S. Mills of Johns Hopkins University re-
vealed that these functionaries tended to display occupational bias and
their selections followed the statistical principle "that any sampling pro-
cedure involving human discretion almost inevitably leads to biased
results."
24
The most significant standard for jury selection was declared in
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,25 which dealt with a problem of sys-
tematic and intentional exclusion of daily wage earners from a federal
court jury panel. The practice was sought to be justified on the basis
that jury service constituted an economic hardship on such persons,
although it was admitted that business men and their wives constituted
at least 50% of the jury lists. 6 The Court, condemning such prac-
tice, said:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection
with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.21
Despite the enunciation of this standard, however, the 1960 Report
of the Judicial Conference from its Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System28 cited with apparent approval an extract from the
Knox Report which read:
23. Gewin, The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968: Implementation in the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 20 MERCER L. REv. 349, 354 (1969).
24. Id. at 354 n.27.
25. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
26. Id. at 222.
27. Id. at 220 (citations omitted and emphasis added). The Court's decision was
grounded upon its supervisory power over the administration of justice in federal
courts. Id. at 220-22. See also Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
Compare Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 722 n.40 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 991 (1966) (declaring the exclusion of daily wage earners as a class to be in
violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, based in part on the belief
that "the Court's language [in Thiel] seems to extend the holding beyond the mere
application of supervisory power"), with Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948)
and Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (holding the mere fact of disproportionate
economic representation, resulting from character, literacy, and property requirements
for state jurors, does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses, even
when this is accomplished by the use of special "blue-ribbon" juries for some cases).
28. 26 F.R.D. 409 (1960).
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It is the sense of the Committee that jurors to serve in the district
courts of the United States should be drawn from every economic and
social group of the community without regard to race, color, or politics,
and that those chosen to serve as jurors should possess as high a degree
of intelligence, morality, integrity, and common sense, as can be found
by the persons charged with the duty of making the selection.
29
This instruction was internally inconsistent since, while giving lip serv-
ice to the cross sectional ideal, it also gave a license to those doing
the choosing to reject all who did not fit their subjective ideal of the
qualities enumerated. Moreover the 1960 Report apparently approved
the "key man" system.
3 0
In 1957, Congress established independent federal juror qualifica-
tions for the first time.31 Nevertheless, much diversity in the selection
of jurors remained and juries were no more representative of the total
community than in the past.32  Why the Thiel principles3 was not fol-
lowed is difficult to explain. One judicial writer suggested that, until
Congress acted, the clerks had no facilities to implement the decision's
mandate.84 Other commentators returned to the concept that only the
intelligent should serve and that, absent any objective measure of this
quality, the number of years in school should be the proper measure
of eligibility to serve.35 In any event, the basic key man system con-
tinued up to the middle 1960s despite the eclectic ferment of the earlier
Warren years. By 1966 the issue of jury reform begged resolution; no
less than 34 bills to reform the jury system80 were pending in Con-
gress. Even before corrective legislation was passed, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit played an important role37 in
jury reforms by challenging the validity of the "key man" system in
Rabinowitz v. United States.38
29. Id. at 425, quoting KNox REPORT, supra note 14, at 13 (emphasis added).
30. 26 F.R.D. at 428-29. See note 19 supra.
31. Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 152, 71 Stat. 634 (1957), as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1861 (1970).
32. See Report of the Comm. on the Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 353, 355 (1967).
33. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
34. Goodman, Federal Jury Selection as Affected by Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co., 6 F.R.D. 253, 258 (1946).
35. McLaughlin, Needed Improvements to Our Jury System, 16 F.R.D. 481, 483
(1954).
36. Address of Chief Justice Warren to the American Law Institute, May 18, 1966.
37. See Gewin, The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968: Implementation in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 20 MERcER L. REv. 349 (1969).
38. 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966). The Rabinowitz court ruled that the Civil Rights
Act of 1957 (cited in note 31 supra) did not create minimum qualifications to which the
1973]
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Jury reformation began in August of 1966 when Chief Justice War-
ren reconstituted the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation
of the Jury System under the chairmanship of Circuit Judge Irving R.
Kaufman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Judicial
Circuit.s9 That committee, representing each of the eleven judicial
circuits, commenced one of the most searching studies ever conducted
by the federal judiciary in an effort to produce appropriate legislation
to reform the jury system. 40 This project, which involved the close
cooperation of all three branches of government, culminated in the
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.41
THE REFORMATION OF THE FEDERAL PETIT
JURY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
The Jury Selection and Service Act of 196842 restructured federal
jury selection procedures. 43  By so doing, it revived certain principles
basic to a democracy which had long been honored in the breach. The
language of the Act44 evidences an overriding desire that the institu-
tion of the jury be revitalized as a democratic force to serve our always
diversified and sometimes alienated peoples. Realization of this goal
involved not only an expanded concept of the rights guaranteed to
the litigant, but also a revival of the petit jury as a democratic institu-
tion which affords a public right of participation in the judicial proc-
ess.
A. The Structure and Purpose of the Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968
The 1968 Act requires that selection of prospective jurors be made
on a random basis from a fair cross section of the entire community
"key man" was free to add his own ideas as to "good character, intelligence and abil-
ity to understand the cases that are tried in court." Id. at 51.
39. See Kaufman, The Judges and Jurors. Recent Development in Selection of
Jurors and Fair Trial-Free Press, 41 COLO. L. REv. 179, 181 (1969).
40. See Report of the Comm. on the Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 353 (1967).
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1861-69, 1871 (1970).
42. Id.
43. Other writers have previously outlined the specific provisions of the Act. See
ABA SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JusrcE 64-68 (5th ed. 1971).
44. It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled
to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random
from a fair cross section of the community. . . . It is further the policy of the
United States that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for
service on grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United States, and
[Vol. 6
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in which the court is located.45 Names are selected from lists of regis-
tered or actual voters within the district or division46 on the basis of a
preestablished formula 7 devised to yield the estimated number of jurors
required for a period specified by the local district court. These names
comprise the master jury wheel. 48 From time to time, a quantity of
names are publicly drawn at random from the master jury wheel;49
juror qualification forms are mailed out,50 returned by the recipients,
and evaluated on the basis of narrowly defined and objective exclu-
sionsr" and excuse opportunities 52 set forth in the district jury plan;
and those names found to be qualified are placed in a qualified jury
wheel. As names of veniremen are needed for service, random selec-
tion is made and summons for jury duty are mailed out to such quali-
fied persons to appear for service at a certain time.53 This entire pro-
cedure is strictly prescribed in a plan adopted by each United States
District Court which specifies the precise procedures to be followed in
shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose. 28
U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the dis-
trict courts of the United States on account of race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, or economic status. Id. § 1862.
45. Id. § 1861.
46. Id. § 1863. The Act allows selection from a source other than voter registra-
tion lists if necessary to protect the rights secured by sections 1861 and 1862. See
note 44 supra and text accompanying note 71 infra.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1970). The names drawn must equal at least one-
half of 1% of the total number of persons on the lists used as a source of names for
the district. However, if this number is believed to be cumbersome and unnecessary,
a lesser number of names may be placed on the master jury wheel, but in no event less
than one thousand. Id. § 1863(b)(3).
48. Id. § 1863 (b) (4), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1863 (b) (4) (Supp. 1973).
49. Id. § 1864(a).
50. Id.
51. Any person must be deemed qualified to serve on a grand or petit jury unless he:
(1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who has resided
for a period of one year within the judicial district;
(2) is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a de-
gree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form;
(3) is unable to speak the English language;
(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render sat-
isfactory jury service; or
(5) has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been
convicted in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored by
pardon or amnesty. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1865(b) (Supp. 1973), amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1865(b) (1970).
52. A group or class of persons may be excused under the Act only if "jury service
by such class or group would entail undue hardship or extreme inconvenience to the
members thereof, and excuse of members thereof would not be inconsistent with sec-
tions 1861 and 1862... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(5) (1970).
53. Id. § 1866(a)-(b).
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order to obviate any deviation from the objective standards of the
Act.
54
These requirements promote the selection of juries which are repre-
sentative and cross sectional55 and prevent the kind of subjective screen-
ing which was possible prior to 1968. To insure that each district
court abides by the law in drafting its district plan, a reviewing panel
must approve the original plan and any subsequent modification
thereto.56 Each district court must submit reports on the jury selec-
tion process to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
and the Judicial Conference of the United States may adopt rules and
regulations governing the plans formulated. 57  Furthermore, litigants
are given the right to challenge deviations from the prescribed proce-
dures by appropriate and timely motion.5" All of these procedures are
important in assuring adherence to the principles of random selection
from a fair cross section of the population and qualification on the
basis of objective and prescribed standards.
Prior to the 1968 Act, few federal courts extended their jury selec-
tion programs much beyond the limits of the city in which the court
was located.59 One highly important change mandated by the 1968
Act requires that jurors be called on a random selection basis from all
54. Id. § 1863.
55. A number of state courts had also adopted the cross sectional standard for jury
composition. E.g., State v. Madison, 213 A.2d 880 (Md. 1965); Allen v. State, 137
S.E.2d 711 (Ga. App. 1964). The Court in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953),
declared in dictum that:
Our duty to protect the federal constitutional rights of all does not mean we
must or should impose on states our conception of the proper source of jury lists,
so long as the source reasonably reflects a cross section of the population suit-
able in character and intelligence for that civic duty. Id. at 474.
56. The reviewing panel consists of the members of the judicial council of the cir-
cuit and either the chief judge of the district whose plan is being reviewed or such
other active district judge of that district as the chief judge of the district may des-
ignate. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (1970).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 1867.
59. Cf. Kaufman, A Fair Jury-The Essence of Justice, 51 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y
88, 92 (1967). Some of the more populous and larger districts limited their name
selections to the geographical area surrounding the city where the courts were held.
For example, California, Northern (30 mile range); California, Southern (40
mile range); New York, Northern (three counties in which terms of court were held);
New York, Southern (rotation between the three counties adjacent to the court); Puerto
Rico (greater percentage from the metropolitan area); Texas, Northern (major por-
tion of names drawn from the city); Wisconsin, Western (only names from the coun-
ties in the area surrounding each place of holding court). Committee on the Operation
of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of the United States, The Jury System
in the Federal Courts-Appendix 23-28 (1960).
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parts of the district if the court is sitting only in one place within the
district.60 If the district is partitioned into divisions jurors are called
on a division-wide basis.61 While jurors can individually claim excuse
from service if they live beyond a certain distance in miles from the
court as specified in the district jury plan, 62 they cannot be excluded
from service on that basis.63 This sort of geographical selection had
been impossible prior to the 1968 Act because of the economic hard-
ship (especially in the lower economic levels) which jury service would
have imposed. Now even low income persons can respond to a jury
summons since the basic per diem fee has been raised to $20 a day 4
plus travel expenses to and from court and, if the juror is held in the
court area overnight, in lieu of travel, he can obtain a $16 per day
subsistence payment both for the first and second day of the overnight
sojourn.65 Thus a blue collar worker, who in some judicial districts
could live hundreds of miles from the courthouse, is now able to re-
spond to a summons for jury service completely at the government's
expense.66 This is a virtual emancipation of the lower economic
classes insofar as jury service is concerned, and has had the additional
benefit of providing geographical and demographic distribution to the
jury panels. 7  Since ethnic and racial minorities are often localized
in specific areas within the judicial district, the Act insured more sat-
isfactory horizontal as well as vertical bases for jury selection. It al-
lowed rural as well as city dwellers to participate, and it reached other
60. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863(b)(3), 1866(a) (1970).
61. Id. § 1863(b)(3). The Act defines "division" to mean:
(1) one or more statutory divisions of a judicial district; or in judicial districts
where there are no statutory divisions, such counties, parishes, or similar political
subdivisions surrounding the places where court is held as the district plan
shall determine .... Id. § 1869(e).
See generally United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (1970).
63. See note 51 supra.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (1970). While the increase in fees was beneficial to the
poor, it would appear that the middle class citizen must still suffer financially when
called to jury duty. Any person who earns more than $20 per day at his regular job
will in effect pay the difference between that amount and his regular salary if his
employer refuses to pay him for the days of work missed due to jury service.
65. Id.
66. H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968).
Since names of prospective jurors will be selected from the voter lists of all
political subdivisions within the district or division, persons living far from the
courthouse will, in contrast to present practice, be afforded the opportunity to
serve if they desire to do so, but a request for an excuse must be granted. Id.
67. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THm AMERICAN JURY 467 (1966), which de-
scribes significant differences in juror attitudes towards leniency on guilt depending
upon the size of the community in which they live.
19731
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diverse groups who had formerly been excluded from jury considera-
tion.
The requirement that each district court conform its selection pro-
gram to the specific prescription of a plan approved by a reviewing
panel is a valuable innovation for several reasons. First, it creates the
-necessary atmosphere of objectivity and removes the public impression
that juries are really hand picked by the court clerk. Second, it makes
clear that the elitist concept of jury service is gone and that jury serv-
ice will no longer be reserved for the few. Third, it enables a litigant
to detect any evasions of the Act and to seek a clear remedy in the
event such an evasion has actually occurred.
The blue ribbon jury concept died hard, but the problems inherent
in any attempt to select such a panel were pointed out by United States
Circuit Court Judge Irving Kaufman at the Senate hearing on the 1968
legislation:
How are the jury officials of the 93 federal district courts to deter-
mine in any meaningful, uniform, well-defined or clear-cut way who
has "intelligence" and "common sense" and who does not? The words
are like globules of mercury-impossible to grasp. The very nature
of the determination the officials are called on to make insures that
the result will depend on who is making it, and if this is so, then it fol-
lows that instead of uniformity in qualifications you would have vari-
ances from district to district ...
The end result of subjective tests is not to secure more intelligent
jurors, but more homogeneous jurors. If this is sought in the American
jury, then it will become very much like the English jury-predom-
inantly middle-aged, middle-class and middle minded. This will be
the achievement if ,we favor high literacy requirements and sub-
jective tests of intelligence and character.68
Judge Kaufman's criticism was one of many reflected in the passage
of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.69 In the four years since
the Act went into effect, the effectiveness and acumen of federal jurors
have not been shown to have been diminished by the Act's direct im-
plementation of an actual cross sectional method of jury selection.
B. Trial by a Cross Sectional Jury as a Right of Every Defendant
The 1968 Act secured to a litigant the right to a jury randomly
68. Hearings on Federal Jury Selection Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14,
-at 256 (1967).
69. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1970).
[Vol. 6
FEDERAL JURY REFORMATION
drawn from a fair cross section of the community.7° This right to a
jury picked at random must be contrasted to the notion that a jury
wheel should proportionately represent various minority groups whose
individual representatives could be hand picked by the court clerk.
Although Congress in designating lists of registered or actual voters
as the source for selection obviously considered such lists to be the best
method of finding a cross section of the greater population, it placed
the responsibility on each district court to assure that this premise
remained valid and to specify other sources of names if at any time
the premise should become invalid. 71  The litigant thus was given a
right to a color-blind, objective selection process which did not cate-
gorize prospective jury list members on the basis of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, national origin or economic status, 72 even if such categori-
zation were for the purpose of assuring a jury list comprised of a cross
section of the community.
The 1968 Act really created no new rights which had not been pre-
viously recognized by the courts.73  Rather, it created new statutory
procedures by which these rights might more effectively be secured.
The statutory implementation of the cross sectional ideal does nothing
to disturb the right of a party to object to jury selection procedures
which discriminate against any group. The belief that a defendant is
injured by systematic exclusion of a group, even if he is not a member
of that group, was clearly enunciated by the United States Supreme
70. Id. § 1861. The principle of the representative jury is not new. It was
first articulated by the United States Supreme Court as a requirement of equal
protection, in cases vindicating the right of a Negro defendant to challenge the syste-
matic exclusion of Negroes from his grand and petit juries. E.g., Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). Subsequently, in the exercise of its supervisory power over
federal courts, the Supreme Court extended the principle to permit any defendant
to challenge the arbitrary exclusion from jury service of his own or any other class.
E.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,
328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). Finally it emerged as an aspect of the constitutional right
to jury trial in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970), wherein the Court
delineated as an essential feature of the jury that is guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment, inter alia, "a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of
the community." Since Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), applied the
Sixth Amendment right to a petit jury to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the representative cross section requirement will apply
to any post Duncan petit jury. See note 74 infra for a discussion of the cross sec-
tional standard to be applied to state jury cases commenced prior to Duncan.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1970).
72. Id. § 1862.
73. See Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966) (discussed in
note 38 supra). See also cases discussed in note 70 supra.
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Court in Peters v. Kiff,74 wherein it was held that any criminal de-
fendant, whatever his race, has standing to challenge a jury selection
system which arbitrarily excludes Negroes from the grand or petit
jury.7- Justice Marshall observed:
[W]e are unwilling to make the assumption that the exclusion of
Negroes has relevance only for issues involving race. When any large
and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury serv-
ice, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human na-
ture and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown
and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the ex-
cluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as
we do, that their exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human
events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented. 7
6
There is evidence that the notion implicitly rejected by the Peters
Court, that a class member called as a juror will inevitably vote for his
own class, 77 is part of the courthouse apocrypha that has no basis in
proof. One black juror, commenting on her jury service in the Dis-
trict of Columbia,78 observed:
Some defense lawyers may feel that the predominantly middle-aged,
predominantly black jury most often chosen in the District is more sym-
pathetic to the black defendant. But they are espousing what seemed
to me yet another bit of folklore. In fact, quite the opposite is true.
Enough crime is enough, such juries feel. We are the victims. You
see it on the unsigned exit questionnaires handed out at month's end
in the early-sunset wintertime. "Give us more protection walking from
74. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). Peters concerned discrimination in the selection of a
state jury and thus was not an interpretation of the federal act. Three members of
the Court (Justices Marshall, Douglas and Stewart) based their decision on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Three other Justices (White, Bren-
nan and Powell) concurred but based their decision on the prohibition contained in
an 1875 statute:
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed
by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of
the United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude .... 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1970).
It is essential to note that Peters involved a petit jury selected prior to Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). There is no doubt as to the Sixth Amendment re-
quirement of a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community after
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See note 70 supra.
Even though Peters arose in the context of a state jury, it ably expressed the philoso-
phy upon which the 1968 Act is based.
75. 407 U.S. at 504.
76. Id. at 503-04. See also Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
77. 407 U.S. at 503.
78. Spingarn, Eye the Jury, The Washington Post, Sept. 10, 1972, at 16, col. 6.
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the Courthouse to the bus." Or "This is a high crime neighborhood;
don't hold us in the court past dark."'79
Furthermore, Professors Kalven and Zeisel have noted:
We suspect there is little or no intrinsic directionality in the jury's re-
spose. It is not fundamentally defendant-prone, rather it is non-rule
minded; it will move where the equities are, and where the equities are
at any given time will depend on both the state of the law and the
climate of public opinion. 0
Both the Jury Selection and Service Act of 196881 and decisional law
82
have rejected the notion that a party is harmed by exclusion of minori-
ties only if he is a member of the group excluded, thus adopting and
revitalizing the cross sectional random selection principle enunciated in
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.8 3
C. The Petit Jury as a Democratic Institution
The principle that a litigant can waive a jury trials4 has often given
encouragement to the thesis that the only purpose of jury service is to
satisfy the individual rights of the litigants to trial by jury. However,
the right of the public to participate in the judicial process is no less
important. In his great essay, Democracy in America, Alexis de Toc-
queville equated the system of the jury to universal suffrage, describ-
ing both as instruments of equal power which contribute to the su-
premacy of the majority.85 Similarly, Justice Black in his dissenting
opinion in Green v. United States88 observed:
The jury injects a democratic element into the law. This element is
vital to the effective administration of criminal justice, not only in safe-
guarding the rights of the accused, but in encouraging popular accept-
ance of the laws and the necessary general acquiescence in their ap-
plication.87
Other commentators have also noted that the law can only command
79. Id.
80. H. KALVEN & H. ZEisEL, ThE AmwcAN JURy 495 (1966).
81. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1970).
82. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
83. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
84. Generally the defendant in a criminal trial can effectively waive his right to
trial by jury. See, e.g., FED. R. Camm. P. 23 (a). However, there is no unconditional
constitutional right which allows the defendant to insist on a trial by judge alone.
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
85. 1 A. DE TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AmmRcA 283 (English transl. 1960).
86. 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
87. Id. at 215-16.
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respect as long as citizens support its enforcement.88  This sense of in-
volvement in the law is crucial in an era of protest and disenchant-
ment, and at a time when population growth has watered down the
value of the political vote. The citizen may no longer feel that his
vote, cast in an automated voting booth for a variety of candidates little
known to him, is of much worth. On the other hand, the petit juror
is empowered to cast a direct vote with knowledge that the outcome
of an important federal case may turn on his own decision. Lord
Devlin has aptly described the jury as "a lamp that shows that freedom
lives."8 9
Critics of the jury system have marshalled arguments for its limita-
tion based on every rationale from a basic distrust of the common citi-
zenry as fact-finder 0 to the expense and delay promoted by this sys-
tem9' vis-a-vis a trial of both fact and law by the judge. These criti-
cisms are thought to be particularly appropriate in civil cases where
there is no public interest which need be reflected in the fact-finding
process.92 With regard to the question of whether the common citi-
zenry can competently cope with issues arising in a complex federal
case Judge Kaufman9P3 has remarked:
In a complicated trial, be it civil or criminal, the proverbial two sides
to every story find strange ways of multiplying into a morass of irrecon-
cilable contentions. The jury, as a deliberative body consisting of in-
dividuals possessed of a variety of backgrounds and experiences, would
seem to be a better instrumentality to sort out truth from near-truth
than a single judge.
My experience as a prosecutor, defense counsel, trial judge and ap-
peals judge has convinced me that juries generally perform their task
with extraordinary conscientiousness and accuracy.94
88. Kaufman, A Fair Jury-The Essence of Justice, 51 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 88, 91
(1967).
89. DEvI.N, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1966).
90. Dean Griswold of Harvard Law School expressed such distrust:
The jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the amateur. Why should anyone think
that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack
of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding controversies
between persons? H. KALvEN & H. ZEISm , THm AMEmucAN JuRy 5 (1966), citing
Harvard Law School Dean's Report 5-6 (1962-63).
91. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188 (1968) (Justice Harlan,
dissenting):
[Jury trial] is a cumbersome process, not only imposing great cost in time and
money on both the State and the jurors themselves, but also contributing to delay
in the machinery of justice.
92. See text following note 129 infra.
93. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
94. Kaufman, Harbingers of Jury Reform, 58 A.B.A.J. 695, 696 (1972) (emphasis
added).
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As to the criticism that trial by jury is inexpedient, it must be recog-
nized that convenience is of limited value as a criterion by which to
evaluate any democratic institution. As early as 1791 Blackstone,
discussing methods of trial which fail to utilize the traditional twelve
man jury, warned:
[However convenient these may appear at first, (as doubtless all ar-
bitrary powers, well executed, are the most convenient) yet let it be
again remembered, that delays, and little inconveniences in the forms
of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty
in more substantial matters; that these inroads upon this sacred bulwark
of the nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our constitu-
tion; and that, though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually in-
crease and spread, to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the most
momentous concern. 5
The sense of public involvement is not the only reason for maintain-
ing the jury as a democratic institution. The jury also provides a
necessary flexibility in the application of legal rules. The judge must
enforce the law in the same way for all, and it is expected that he will
do so. But the jury is able to temper the rule of law to achieve jus-
tice in the particular case notwithstanding the legal presumption that
juries follow the judge's instructions.9 6
Appellate courts place great emphasis on the precise wording of the
jury instructions during an appellate review of the trial record for re-
versible error. However, more often than not, jurors will employ their
own sense of reality rather than the nuances of technical definitions
when asked to apply the instructions to a particular human situation.
95. 4 BLACKSTONE, CoMmNTARiEs 350 (11th ed. 1791).
96. The extent to which a jury may temper the law with its own value judgments is
largely dependent upon whether the particular case is civil or criminal in nature.
In civil cases, the jury will never have an opportunity to decide the factual issues if the
judge directs a verdict or grants a non-suit (such an order should be made only if the
court finds that there is not sufficient evidence to support a verdict in favor of the
party against whom the motion has been made). See Kingston v. McGrath, 232 F.2d
495 (9th Cir. 1956). A similar result is reached when the court grants a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See F.D. R. Civ. P. 50(b). However, when
the case is criminal in nature the jury is given much greater latitude in reaching a ver-
dict of acquittal. The ability of the jury to disregard the evidence is often referred to
as "jury nullification." See Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No,
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972). Because of the restriction embodied in the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution, normally the prosecutor will be
unable to appeal the acquittal regardless of the weight of the evidence pointing to the
guilt of the defendant. U.S. CONST. amend. V. It should be noted, however, that the
prosecutor is able to appeal based on prescribed limited grounds other than insufficiency
of the evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
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Kalven and Zeisel, in their study of the American jury, 97 found that
jurors will consider whether Providence has already punished the de-
fendant enough, will place their own interpretation on provocation,
and will consider the issue of the penalty together with that of guilt.
As they put it, the jury "will move where the equities are."' 8
Critics of the jury system would argue that the ultimate effects em-
anating from the infusion of juror attitudes into legal verdicts are dis-
regard of the law and judicial anarchy. Such criticism fails to recog-
nize that more is involved in the jury process than simply a mirroring
of individual juror attitudes; because juries en masse reflect the con-
science of the community, the jury system is very much a democratic
institution by which the attitudes of the community at large are brought
into the court room and given a voice in the judicial determination
of a wide range of community conflicts.99 A trial judge cannot pos-
sibly fulfill this function because, despite his legal expertise, he cannot
express the conscience of the community. Since he is normally from
an upper middle class milieu, and is educated far beyond the average
member of the community, his attitudes and perceptions differ sub-
stantially from those of many jurors. Furthermore, even if the judge
does reflect attitudes similar to those of any "average juror," he is only
one person reflecting a single background rather than the collective
experiences of the jury panel.
Both the Senate and House reports on the 1968 Act expressed the
desire to bring public attitudes into the court room:
It must be remembered that the jury is designed not only to under-
stand the case, but also to reflect the community's sense of justice in
deciding it.100
Thus, Congress has for the first time recognized the interest of the
general public in the jury as a democratic institution.
THE REFORMATION: FouR YEARS LATER
While the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 made great strides
toward revitalizing the jury system as an effective instrument for pub-
lic participation, several problems remained. Some of these problems
have subsequently been dealt with; others continue to exist. The ex-
clusion of youthful jurors and the unavailability of certain information
97. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMmucAN JURY (1966).
98. Id. at 493.
99. Id. at 493-95.
100. S. Rep. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1967); H.R. Rep. No. 1076, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968).
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necessary to enforce the Act are difficulties which in large part have
been remedied. On the other hand, the move toward smaller jury pan-
els in criminal cases, 0 1 the failure of the judicial system to effectively
utilize jurors, the continuing use of peremptory challenges, and the dis-
ruptive effect of the news media on juries present problems which con-
tinue to threaten the democratic nature of the jury.
Although the 1968 Act provided a broad base from which to gather
jurors, it still did not provide for the fullest possible public participation
in federal juries because of its exclusion of veniremen under the age of
twenty-one.' 0 2 However, the inclusion of youths on federal juries was
stimulated by passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution 03 and by the growing insistence of youths that per-
sons liable for military service should be able to obtain the rights and re-
sponsibilities of full citizenship. Furthermore, the median age of the
criminal defendant had declined from 33.7 years in 1963 to 27.1 years in
1970.104 The average age of those offenders violating the Selective Ser-
vice law' 05 and the Dyer Act,0 6 two federal provisions most frequently
infringed by young people, was even lower. Thus, the belief prevailed in
these younger offenders that they were not being tried by a jury com-
posed of their peers. Despite the disparity between the ages of jurors and
defendants in such cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ruled in 1971107 that the exclusion of jurors under the age of
twenty-one did not deny the defendant a jury of his peers.'0 8 Addi-
tionally, the fact that a youth registering to vote between the ages of 21
and 23 might not be chosen and summoned to jury service for up to
four years from the time of registration has been held not to render
the jury selection system imbalanced.109
Although constitutional arguments failed, federal legislation has suc-
ceeded in allowing younger persons to sit on federal juries. On April
101. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (1970).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years
of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropri-
ate legislation.
104. ADmINISTRATIE OFFmCE OF THFE UNrED STATES CouRTs, FEDERAL OFNDERs
IN THE UNTED STATES DIsmcTR CouRTs 67 (1970).
105. 50 U.S.C. App. § 451 et seq. (1970).
106. 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 2311-13 (1970).
107. United States v. Allen, 445 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971).
108. Id.
109. United States v. Kuhn, 441 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1971).
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6, 1972, the 1968 Act was amended to require provisions in each dis-
trict jury plan mandating the inclusion of names of persons from ages
18 to 21 in master jury wheels, and the emptying and refilling of such
wheels at least once every four years."' The 1972 statute also re-
quired that each master jury wheel be initially emptied and refilled
by September 1, 1973, using names taken from voter lists for the 1972
general election"' (which, of course, will contain voter names in the
lower age group). While younger persons are now legally qualified
for jury service, the time-lag created by the four-year cycle of name
selection from quadrennial general elections and the one-year residency
requirement for jury service 12 make it improbable that large numbers
of persons from ages 18 to 21 will be called for jury duty. The amend-
ment will insure, however, that more persons in their early twenties will
serve on juries.
Even though the 1968 Act created procedures by which its provi-
sions could be enforced," 3 some procedures soon were discovered to be
inherently ineffective. While the Act required that the court system
monitor the juror selection program to insure that a fair cross section
of the population was being considered for jury duty, the same Act al-
lowed the recipient of juror qualification questionnaires the option of
refusing to answer the race question." 4  In practice it was found,
based on surveys of the courts in the Fourth and Fifth Judicial Cir-
cuits, that up to 30% of recipients of the qualification form' did not
answer the race question." 5 The lack of information made accurate
sampling procedures impossible." 6 The anomalous result of the Act
110. Act of April 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-269, § 1-2, 86 Stat. 117, amending
28 U.S.C. H9 1865(b)(1), 1863(b)(4) (1970) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. H9 1865(b)
(1), 1863(b)(4) (Supp. 1973) ).
111. Act of April 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-269, § 3, 86 Stat. 117.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (1970), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1865(b)(1)
(Supp. 1973).
113. The 1968 Act vested the Judicial Conference of the United States with
the power to adopt rules and regulations governing the provisions of the Act. 28
U.S.C. § 1863(a) (1970). One such rule, adopted by the Conference at its Fall 1969
session, required that reports be submitted after the refilling of each master jury
wheel reflecting (1) the race and sex of a prescribed sample of persons whose names
were placed in the master jury wheels in each division and (2) the race, sex and
occupation of a prescribed sample of those who were summoned and appeared for
jury service. ADmusTRA'nv OFFIca, OF TH UNIrE STATES COURTS, REPORTS OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES 65-66 (1969).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1869(h) (1970).
115. Hearings on H.R. 8829 and Identical Bills Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, at 34-43 (1971).
116. Id. at 35, 43.
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was that, while the courts were charged with insuring that a fair cross
section of the population was considered for jury service, there was
no way to accurately test actual jury composition. Obviously, to as-
sure compliance with those provisions of the Act proscribing discrim-
ination in the jury selection process, n1 7 it is necessary to have enough
information to compare the percentage of a recognized minority in the
jury wheel against census data for the district.11
Congress has very recently corrected this situation by amending the
definition of "juror qualification form" in the Act to make the race
question mandatory. 9 The 1972 amendment requires that the form
shall contain words explaining that "information concerning race is re-
quired solely to enforce nondiscrimination in jury selection and has no
bearing on an individual's qualification for jury service."1 2 ' Hope-
fully, this amendment will allow the federal courts to monitor the jury
selection program to detect more accurately imbalance in voter lists, or
in the master jury wheels themselves, and thus protect the system
against even inadvertent discrimination.
Whether the jury should be reduced in size so as to make it a more
efficient fact finding body is an issue which has become the subject
of considerable discussion in recent years. 2' The smaller jury is less
expensive122 because it can be managed with more facility from voir
dire to the rendering of the verdict. The time saved in selection of
jurors, in their handling of exhibits during trial, in their going to and
returning from the jury box, and in other miscellaneous matters of
trial routine greatly reduces the time of trial according to the advo-
cates of the smaller jury panel.'
2
1
117. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1865 (1970).
118. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582
(9th Cir. 1971); Preston v. Mandeville, 428 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1970); Note, Carmical
v. Craven: De Facto Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 23 HASTINGS L.J 1291
(1972).
119. Act of September 29, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-437, 86 Stat. 740, amending
28 U.S.C. § 1869(h) (1970) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1869(h) (Supp. 1973)).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Bogue & Fritz, The Six-Man Jury, 17 S. DA. L. REv. 285 (1972);
Devitt, Six-Member Civil Juries Gain Backing, 57 A.B.AJ. 1111 (1971); Tamm,
A Proposal for Five Member Civil Juries in Federal Courts, 50 A.B.AJ. 162 (1964).
122. Based upon the experience of the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota in utilizing six member juries, the Chief Judge for that district esti-
mated that an annual savings of over $1,600,000 could be realized by employing
smaller juries nationwide in the federal courts. Devitt, Six-Member Civil Juries Gain
Backing, 57 A.B.AJ. 1111, 1112 (1971).
123. See note 122 supra; cf. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING
JUROR UTILIZATION IN UNITED STATES DIsTucr CouRTs 4-6 (1972).
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Any question of a constitutional ban against reducing the size of
criminal juries was disposed of in 1970 when the United States Su-
preme Court ruled in Williams v. Florida2 4 that the Sixth Amendment,
as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not mandate a twelve man jury in criminal trials. 21
The Court reasoned that the number of twelve "is an historical acci-
dent, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly
without significance 'except to mystics.' -126
Congress has shown little interest in reducing the size of federal
criminal juries since the Williams decision; 12 7 fifty-eight federal district
courts, however, have reduced the size of civil juries to six by local
rule. 28  And in 1971 the Judicial Conference approved in principle
124. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
125. Id. at 86. The Court has also held that, at least in state criminal trials, the
right to trial by jury does not require a unanimous verdict. In Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356 (1972), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by a state law which allows con-
viction or acquittal by the vote of nine out of twelve jurors in a criminal case. Since
the Johnson case was tried prior to the time that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
trial by jury was applied to the states, the Court's decision did not reach the ques-
tion of whether the Sixth Amendment itself requires unanimous jury verdicts. This
question was involved, however, in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), a com-
panion case to the Johnson decision. In Apodaca, four justices (White, Burger, Black-
mun and Rehnquist) ruled that less than unanimous juries do not violate the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 411-12. Justice Powell felt that, although the Due Process Clause
does not require unanimous juries in state courts, the Sixth Amendment would impose
such a requirement in federal cases. Id. at 371. The four dissenting justices (Stewart,
Douglas, Marshall and Brennan) would require unanimity in federal and state courts.
Id. at 414. It should be noted that Justice Powell's conclusion that a different stand-
ard applies in federal and state cases would provide the necessary fifth vote for a ma-
jority holding that unanimity is required in federal cases.
126. 399 U.S. at 102, quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 182 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Helwig, The American Jury System: A Time
for Reexamination, 55 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 96, 97 (1971). The Williams Court left open
the issue whether the two references to the "common law" in the Seventh Amend-
ment require the traditional twelve member jury. This issue was recently resolved in
Colgrove v. Battin, 41 U.S.L.W. 5025 (1973), wherein the Court extended the Williams
analysis to uphold a federal district court's local rule prescribing six-member juries in
civil cases.
127. One bill was introduced in the 92nd Congress which would reduce the size of
federal juries in both civil and criminal non-capital cases. H.R. 7800, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
128. Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the Common Law: No Magic in Num-
bers, 56 F.R.D. 507, 535-42 (1973) (listing fifty-four district courts which have re-
duced the size of juries to six members) (The remaining four districts which have
similarly reduced the size of juries are Connecticut, South Carolina, Puerto Rico and
Vermont). The United States Supreme Court has quite recently upheld the validity of
such local rules. Colgrove v. Battin, 41 U.S.L.W. 5025 (1973).
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a reduction in the size of civil juries.129
As has been previously discussed, one important attribute of the
jury system is the vicarious participation of the community at large
in the judicial process through its twelve representatives in the jury
box. 0 Thus, when appraising any possible impairment to the judi-
cial process resulting from a reduction in jury size, it is necessary to
consider not only the possibility of decreased jury competence as fact
finders, but also the likelihood that a smaller number of jurors would
be less representative of community values than a larger panel. 3 ' In
civil cases, where the function of the jury is more in the nature of
pure fact-finding between rival private parties, we may well be willing
to settle for a less representative jury as the price paid for increased
jury efficiency. Social values are far less important in a civil case
than in a criminal trial where "the people' are directly concerned with
the verdict and may have strong feelings as to the ultimate sentence
which they expect to be levied against the offender. However,
when the case is criminal in nature and thus the interests of society
are directly in issue, a larger group is needed to represent a broader
spectrum of social attitudes on crime and punishment, to share public
responsibility for the verdict, and to insure that there is no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. Whether the twelve man jury
will eventually be replaced with smaller panels in federal criminal cases
is still an unanswered question; but it is important to recognize that
such a change would possibly affect the nature of the jury as a demo-
cratic institution.
Regardless of the size of the panel upon which the juror serves,
one of the most frustrating aspects of his service is the endless waiting
in assembly rooms which usually accompanies the courtroom experi-
ence.' 32  A 1971 study showed that 45.8% of jurors called to the
courthouse did not serve on trials. 3 3 In the federal district court
serving New York city this figure was in excess of 78% 134 This prob-
129. ADMiNmS'TRATivE OFFICE OF THE UNTED STATES COURTS, REPORTS OF THB
PRocEEDINGs OF Tm JUDICIAL CONFE ENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES 5-6 (1971).
130. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
131. See Ginger, Doris Brin Walker Discusses the Angela Davis Case, 2 HUM&N
RIGHTS 139, 149 (1972).
132. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING JUROR UTILIZATION IN
UNITED STATES DisTcr COURTS 3 (1972). See also Kaufman, The Wasted Juror, 56
J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 72 (1972).
133. ADMINISTRATVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, JUROR UTIIJZATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 2 (1971).
134. Id.
1973]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
lem is caused in large part because many civil cases are settled only
on the day of trial.1' 5 Similarly, in criminal cases there is a tendency
to enter a guilty plea only at the last moment after dilatory motions
have been disposed of and the possibility of plea bargaining has been
fully explored.'3 6  Meanwhile, jurors must wait until a trial is firmly
set on the morning of their appearance. As a result, jurors are fre-
quently sent home without ever seeing a courtroom. 87 The explana-
tion often given to such jurors-that they are performing a vital serv-
ice by just being present-often falls on deaf ears.
The federal judiciary is considering use of the "omnibus hearing"
procedure, primarily to speed up trials, but also to reduce the problem
of poor juror utilization. 38  This omnibus plan requires that all mo-
tions be heard at one time and encourages early pleas."' Also con-
templated is application of a jury selection formula which would pro-
vide for staggered trials 40 and the use of left over jurors from one
trial part in another trial part.' 4' The effect of the suggested new
procedures would be a reduction in the total number of jurors called
and a more efficient utilization of those serving.' 42  At the very least,
it appears that there has been a recognition of the problem of poor
juror utilization. This problem must be solved if we expect the jury
system to remain vital.
The 1968 Act had as its purpose the establishment of a cross sec-
135. Id.; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING JUROR UTILIZATION
IN UNITED STATES DiStRICt CoURTS 22-23 (1972).
136. A mnasTRATwvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, JUROR UTILIZATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 2 (1971); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUmELINES FOR IMPROVING JUROR
UTILZATION IN UNITED STATES DIsnruCr CouRTs 23 (1972).
137. In the fiscal year 1971 there were 512,553 "paid juror days." Of this
total, 234,807 juror days represent days when jurors performed no trial service. Id.
138. See 1969 Judicial Conference Proceedings (10th Cir.), Minimum Standards for
Criminal justice, 49 F.R.D. 347, 446-47 (1970).
139. Id.
140. The effect of staggering trials is illustrated by the following example:
If 25 jurors are needed to conduct one trial, then the number of jurors needed for
the jury itself is 12, leaving 13 jurors for purposes of peremptory challenges and
as a safety factor or hedge against last minute absences of jurors or unexpected
disqualifications. If two judges are trying cases, only 12 additional jurors or a
total of 37 need be called. One of the two judges will select his jury from the
entire venire of 37 and the remaining 25 jurors can be returned to the second
courtroom for the second trial. A staggering in the selection of jurors is some-
times required. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING JUROR UTI-
LIZATION IN THE UNrrD STATES DISTRIR COURTS 25, 26 (1972), quoting ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Item H2, Att. 5 (1970).
141. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING JUROR UTILIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES DISTuCT COURTS 24 (1972).
142. Id. at 24-25.
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tional jury system, under which no juror would be eliminated from
service as a result of his or her race, religion or national origin.14 At
the same time, however, Congress authorized the continuing use of a
device by which jurors may be excluded for these very reasons-the
peremptory challenge.' 4 4  The practice of allowing parties the oppor-
tunity to challenge jurors without cause is an ancient practice, originat-
ing at a time when no procedures for prior screening of jurors were
employed.' 45  The peremptory challenge was perhaps needed at that
time to ferret out jurors whose bias was revealed during the voir dire
examination. Whether the peremptory challenge, retained in both civil
and criminal cases by the 1968 Act, 14 6 remains a necessary practice
today is questionable. The requirement that jury lists represent a
community cross section 47 and the ability of a party to challenge a
juror for cause'4 s if prejudice is uncovered during the voir dire exami-
nation 49 may be sufficient to assure a fair jury without the delay re-
sulting from the use of peremptory challenges. The most forceful
argument against the peremptory challenge, however, is not that it is
a time consuming procedure, but rather that it introduces into the jury
selection system an opportunity for the very kind of prejudice and bias
which the Act proscribes. Because there is no inquiry into the reason
behind the exercise of a peremptory challenge, a juror may be excluded
merely because of the way he answers a question, the accent with
which he speaks, or even because he is a member of a minority race.'8 0
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the arbitrary
143. See note 44 supra.
144. The 1968 Act authorizes each party to exercise three peremptory challenges
in civil cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1970). FED. R. CiuM. P. 24(b), which allows
each side a varying number of peremptory challenges in criminal cases, depending
upon the seriousness of the crime, was left unchanged.
145. See United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 481 (1827).
146. See note 144 supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 70-83 supra.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1970).
149. It is the practice in federal courts for the trial judge, rather than the ad-
versary attorneys, to conduct the voir dire. See FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a); FED. R.
C0iM. P. 24(a). The same practice may soon become prevalent in California as a
result of a recent decision by the California Supreme Court. People v. Crowe, 8 Cal.
3d 815, 506 P.2d 193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973). The effectiveness of the voir dire
as an instrument for the uncovering of prejudice may be reduced under this procedure
if the trial judge is unduly concerned with the expedient conduct of the trial. On the
other hand, attorneys have frequently misused voir dire to generate bias and to in-
fluence the jurors in favor of the examining lawyer and his case. See ABA PROJECT
ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY
JURY § 2.4, Commentary, at 64 (1968).
150. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965).
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nature of the peremptory challenge in Swain v. Alabama,15 1 ruling that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
prohibit either side in a state criminal trial from excusing jurors solely
on the basis of race:' 52
The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one ex-
ercised without a reason stated, without. . being subject to the court's
control ...
[Wie cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a
denial of equal protection of the laws. 15
3
The Swain court did suggest, however, that if the prosecutor system-
atically excludes a racial group by means of peremptory challenges,
"in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime
and whoever the defendant or victim may be," such conduct would
violate the Equal Protection Clause.- 4
Clearly, the peremptory challenge system is due for examination and
study. Does it serve a purpose today? Is it a proper method for ex-
cluding the prospective juror whose responses on voir dire eluded a
challenge for cause but who seems to stand out by his demeanor as a
prejudiced person? It must be recognized that, although the peremptory
challenge was originally intended to avoid prejudice, today, given the
license of the Swain decision,'55 it is probably the single most signifi-
cant means by which such prejudice and bias is injected into the jury
selection system.
Not all juror bias is the result of ethnic background, environmental
surroundings and peer associations. Frequently, the objectivity of the
jury panel is threatened by the very nature of the case it is called
upon to hear. One of the more challenging tasks faced by the federal
judiciary in the second half of this century has been that of preserving
the impartiality of the jury trial in the face of the pervasive publicity
given the sensational criminal case, while at the same time securing
the right of the press to print,15 6 and of the public to know, the issues and
151. Id.
152. Id. at 221-22.
153. Id. at 220-21 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 223. One might question how such conduct on the part of the prose-
cutor could ever be established. In Swain, despite the fact that there had not been a
Negro on a jury since about 1950, the Court ruled that there was not sufficient evi-
dence to support an inference that the prosecutor was bent on striking Negroes. Id.
at 224-26.
155. See text accompanying notes 151-54 supra.
156. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. Despite the guarantee of the First Amendment, the
United States Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the press can be punished by
way of contempt for failure to obey a court order when there is a clear and present
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details of both criminal and civil trials. 157  The problem of prejudicial
publicity has become greatly magnified by the immediacy and uni-
versality of the television camera which is capable of capturing not
only the drama of the courthouse but also, upon occasion, the crime
itself. The camera inevitably tends to focus on the sideshow aspects
of the case: the tearful wife, the boastful prosecutor, the statements
of neighbors who knew the defendant in his youth. It is often diffi-
cult to find jurors who have not followed a sensational crime via the
news media and therefore formed an opinion about the case before en-
tering the courtroom. Jurors, aware that they have been drawn into
the eye of the storm, may be influenced more by their role as par-
ticipants in a public story than by the evidence presented during the
trial.' It is at this point that individual rights of litigants to a fair
and impartial trial collide with the freedom guaranteed to the press by
the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court discussed
the accommodation necessary to preserve these competing rights in
Shepard v. Maxwell,'5 9 wherein the trial court was placed under a duty
to take affirmative action to reduce the massive, pervasive and preju-
dicial publicity attending the defendanfs prosecution. 60 The Judicial
danger that justice will be obstructed. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367
(1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); cf. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375 (1962); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971).
157. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently stated the
essence of the problem:
Media of publicity have the right to report what happens in open court. An
accused has a right to a trial by an impartial jury on evidence which is legally
admissible. The public has the right to demand and expect "fair trials designed to
end in just judgments." These rights must be accommodated in the best possible
manner. Mares v. United States, 383 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1967), quoting
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
158. The treatment of the jurors in Shepard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1961),
illustrates the extent to which a juror may become a public figure:
As the selection of the jury progressed, individual pictures of prospective mem-
bers appeared daily. During the trial, pictures of the jury appeared over 40 times
in the Cleveland papers alone. The court permitted photographers to take
pictures of the jury in the box, and individual pictures of the members in the jury
room. One newspaper ran pictures of the jurors at the [defendant's] home when
they went there to view the scene of the murder. Another paper featured the home
life of an alternate juror. The day before the verdict was rendered-while the
jurors were at lunch and sequestered by two bailiffs-the jury was separated into
two groups to pose for photographs which appeared in the newspapers. 384
U.S. at 345.
159. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
160. Id. at 362-63. Justice Clark noted several specific actions which the trial
court should have taken to ensure that the defendant was not deprived of due process
of the law: (1) the number of reporters in the courtroom should have been limited,
(2) the witnesses should have been insulated from the news media, and (3) release of
leads, information and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses and counsel
for both sides should have been proscribed, Id. at 358-59.
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Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System spent ap-
proximately two years studying procedures which might satisfy the
requirement of the Shepard case. 161 The culmination of the Commit-
tee's effort was the promulgation of several specific recommendations
by which federal courts could balance the Shepard mandate for a fair
trial with the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press.'6 2 The
Committee recommended that each district court control the release
of information by attorneys and other officers of the court,168 provide
by local rule for special orders governing the proceedings in any case
in which prejudicial influences might penetrate into the trial,164 and
implement rules to prohibit photography and radio and television
broadcasting, in both the courtroom and its environs, in connection
with judicial proceedings. 65 No recommendation was made to place
a direct restraint on the press with regard to publication of potentially
prejudicial material, 66 nor was any recommendation made with re-
spect to the exclusion of the press from preliminary hearings and other
hearings held outside the presence of the jury.1'7 Additionally, the
Committee declined making any recommendation as to judicially im-
posed restrictions on the release of information by federal law enforce-
ment agencies.' 68  Implementation of the Committee's recommenda-
tions have done much to reduce the gross violations of the defendant's
right to a fair trial. Nevertheless, the sensational criminal trial con-
tinues to receive massive coverage by the news media. While this in-
fringement upon the guarantee of a fair trial may be the price we
must pay for a free press, such publicity, and the resulting inability
to obtain unbiased veniremen, must continue to be considered a prob-
lem affecting the jury system.
CONCLUSION
Reshaping the entire jury system was no easy task. Judges are used
to proceeding by the building block system-a little change at a time
161. Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968).
162. Id. at 404. While the initial Report only concerned criminal cases, the recom-
mendations have subsequently been extended to cover civil cases as well. Supple-
mental Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 51 F.R.D. 135 (1971).
163. 45 F.R.D. at 404-08.
164. Id. at 409.
165. Id. at 401, 414.
166. Id. at 401-02.
167. Id. at 403.
168. Id.
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until the form achieves substance. It took a strong interaction among
all three branches of government to produce the impetus for change
in 1966,109 culminating in the Jury Selection and Service Act of
1968.170 The Act ended a system of jury selection which often pro-
duced panels unrepresentative of the community. The passage of the
Act additionally led to further introspection by the judiciary, which
initiated changes to protect the jury as a body of fact finders which
ideally is sensitive to the pulse of the community without being domi-
nated or overwhelmed by the momentary group passions that surround
a sensational trial. Perhaps, today, those groups previously excluded
from federal juries feel a stronger sense of involvement in government
as a result of the broadened participation in the jury system. Not
only is the sense of public participation important, but a court ceases
to function effectively when it is so detached from the community that
its decisions, including its attempts to control antisocial behavior, are
rendered in a vacuum. Now, more than ever, courts are coping with
human problems that eschew the legal cult of the powdered wig and
the quill pen. Perhaps, looking through a glass darkly, the future
will prove that some of those concerned with an impersonal world did
something to insure that the public still has a voice in the Third Branch
of Government.
169. See text accompanying notes 36-41 supra.
170. See text accompanying notes 42-69 supra.
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